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EvidenceCorner | Spousal Privilege

He loves me? He loves me not?
He wants to keep me from testifying?
By Cynthia Ford
Valentine’s Day having just passed, I thought I would devote
this month to the Spousal Privilege as it exists in Montana.
They don’t show this on any of the jewelry store ads in early
February, but under some circumstances, buying a wedding
ring might also buy you freedom. You don’t have to return the
ring, but you should at least be aware of the legal implications
of the nuptials.

PRIVILEGES IN GENERAL
A privilege protects a confidential communication between
two qualifying persons from disclosure in discovery1 and at
trial, even if the communication is both relevant and extremely
important to the determination of a fact at issue in the litigation. Every privilege necessarily impedes the search for truth,
and consequently, justice. I think of privilege as a gag in the
mouth of someone who KNOWS, having gotten the information from “the horse’s mouth,” but who is prevented from
saying what he was told, even though in some circumstances
he affirmatively may want to disclose the contents of the
communication.
The justification for the privileges which are recognized by
the law is uniform: the relationship between the persons to the
communication itself serves the public good, and the ability of
the parties to speak freely and without fear of later disclosure
is essential to that beneficial relationship. Thus, if the communication is made in confidence and kept in confidence, the law
will honor that confidence. The relationship in effect trumps
the interest in the complete truth. M.C.A. 26-1-801 expresses
this:
26-1-801. Policy to protect confidentiality in
certain relations. There are particular relations
in which it is the policy of the law to encourage
confidence and to preserve it inviolate; therefore,
a person cannot be examined as a witness in the
cases enumerated in this part.

THE MONTANA V. FEDERAL
APPROACHES TO PRIVILEGE
The state and federal privilege regimes are very different
1 Both the state and federal versions of Civil Procedure Rule 26 state that a party
may discover any matter which is relevant (and this term is construed more broadly than at trial) AND “non-privileged.”
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procedurally. Under the FRE, in non-diversity cases2, federal
evidentiary privileges are expressly judge-made. FRE 501 states:
The common law — as interpreted by United
States courts in the light of reason and experience
— governs a claim of privilege unless any of the
following provides otherwise:
• the United States Constitution;
• a federal statute; or
• rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.3
FRE 501 is a Congressional revision to the version of FRE
Article V submitted by the Supreme Court, which actually
contained several specific rules, each setting forth the terms of
a particular privilege. Congress morphed these into a single
rule, 501, conferring the development of federal evidentiary
privilege law on the federal courts, case-by-case. For more
explanation of this remarkable sleight-of-hand, see Trammel v.
U.S. Montana’s privilege law is exactly the opposite. Montana’s
privileges are found solely in legislation. MRE 501 provides:
Rule 501. Privileges recognized only as
provided. Except as otherwise provided by
constitution, statute, these rules, or other rules
applicable in the courts of this state, no person has
a privilege to:
(1) refuse to be a witness;
(2) refuse to disclose any matter;
(3) refuse to produce any object or writing;
or
(4) prevent another from being a witness
or disclosing any matter or producing any
object or writing.
In addition to MRE 501, Article V contains one specific
PRIVILEGE, next page
2 FRE 501’s last sentence provides that in diversity cases, privilege is to be determined by state law. This clear statement obviates the need for that sticky Erie
determination of whether evidentiary privileges are substantive (state law) or
procedural (federal).
3 The Constitutional reference is to the privilege against self-incrimination.
Congress has not enacted any privilege statutes itself, and the only other “rule
prescribed by the Supreme Court” is FRE 502 (effective 12/1/2011), which deals
not with a privilege per se but treatment of disclosures of attorney-client and
work-product material.

Page 35

and defendant leaving the courtroom hand-in-hand, which
would presumably not occur if she just testified against him.
(Some of my students report that their marriages are strong
privilege (Rule 502, privilege of government to refuse to disclose
enough that he would forgive her for her adverse testimony, but
the identity of a confidential informant, which became effective
I have lived longer). The spousal communications privilege,
4
in 1990). The rest of Montana’s privileges are located primarily
on the other hand, depends on the marital status of the parties
in Title 26, Chapter 1, Part 8 of the MCA, entitled “Privileges.”
at the time the communication between the spouses occurred,
The Commission Comment to MRE 501 makes it very clear that
even if they are no longer married at the time of the testimony.
Montana intends its privilege law to come from the legislature,
The theory is that free communication without fear of comrather than the judicial approach adopted by the FRE:
pelled disclosure is good for marriage, and marriage is good for
The rule provides that only the privileges
society. My nickname for this privilege is “the pillow talk priviincorporated by reference shall be recognized and
lege,” but I wouldn’t use that in court and of course it covers all
so has the effect of cutting off any further case law
confidential communications between spouses, whether in the
recognition of privileges. The final four clauses in
bedroom, kitchen, car, or chairlift.
this rule represent a delineation of the elements
The spousal testimonial privilege operates to keep a spouse
of a testimonial privilege and are intended to
off the stand altogether in a case involving the other spouse. In
clarify privileges generally. This rule represents a
its most traditional, Olde Englande, form, this privilege was
new approach to the use of privileges in Montana
a logical extension of the privilege against self-incrimination.
courts.
The wife was seen as the property of the husband, so if she testified against her husband, it was as if he was testifying against
Notwithstanding the procedural differences in the creation
himself. Although this property view of marriage no longer
of privileges, both the Montana and the U.S. Supreme Courts
exists, the privilege is extant in many jurisdictions. In fact, the
hold that privileges are and to be narrowly construed precisely
U.S. Supreme Court recently acknowledged the privilege even
because they abrogate the search for truth.
as it narrowed it in Trammel v. U.S., 445 U.S. 40, 100 S.Ct. 906,
Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges
63 L.Ed.2d 186 (holding that the privilege belongs solely to the
contravene the fundamental principle that “ ‘the
witness-spouse, who is the best judge of whether there is a marpublic ... has a right to every man’s evidence.’ ” As
riage worth preserving5):
such, they must be strictly construed and accepted
“only to the very limited extent that permitting a
[The testimonial] privilege is invoked, not to
refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence
exclude private marital communications, but
has a public good transcending the normally
rather to exclude evidence of criminal acts and of
predominant principle of utilizing all rational
communications made in the presence of third
means for ascertaining truth.” Trammel v. United
persons.
States (1980), 445 U.S. 40, 50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 912,
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51, 100 S. Ct. 906,
63 L.Ed.2d 186, 195 (citations omitted).
913, 63 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1980). The Supreme Court elected to
State v. MacKinnon, 1998 MT 78, 288 Mont. 329,
maintain only a limited form of the privilege, vesting the deci336, 957 P.2d 23, 27. See also, State v. Gooding,
sion about whether to testify in the witness-spouse whether
1999 MT 249, 296 Mont. 234, 238, 989 P.2d 304,
than the defendant-spouse:
307.
The contemporary justification for affording an
accused such a privilege is also unpersuasive.
SPOUSAL TESTIMONIAL V.
When one spouse is willing to testify against
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGES
the other in a criminal proceeding-whatever the
motivation-their relationship is almost certainly
States and the federal government differ about which
in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of
relationships to privilege, but some sort of spousal privilege
marital harmony for the privilege to preserve.
(communication, testimonial, or both: see below) is common.
In these circumstances, a rule of evidence that
The marital privileges all stem from the public policy in favor
permits an accused to prevent adverse spousal
of marriage. “[T]he purpose behind spousal privilege is to pretestimony seems far more likely to frustrate justice
serve the sanctity of the marriage and home.” In re Marriage of
than to foster family peace
Sarsfield, 206 Mont. 397, 406, 671 P.2d 595 (1983).
There are two types of spousal privilege, each aimed at the
445 U.S. at 52, 100 S. Ct. at 913, 63 L. Ed. 2d 186
public policy in favor of marriage but differing in terms of the
(1980).
way in which the privilege protects marriage. Jurisdictions recognize one or both. The spousal testimonial privilege prevents
PRIVILEGE, next page
a person married at the time of trial from testifying, in order to
preserve the then-existing marriage. My visual is the witness
5 Mrs. Trammel wanted to testify for the government in her husband’s drug case.
PRIVILEGE, from previous page

4 Primarily is not the same as exclusively. As always, a wise practitioner should
search the rest of the M.C.A. for scattered exceptions. Spousal privilege is a good
example: there are applicable statutes in both Title 26 and Title 46.
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The defendant argued that her testimony was not truly voluntary, induced as it
was by an offer of immunity from her own prosecution. The Supreme Court ruled
in favor of the government, holding that the reason Mrs. Trammel agreed to take
the stand was irrelevant:
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The federal system, then, recognizes both the spousal
communications privilege and a limited form of the spousal
testimonial privilege. These federal spousal privileges apply to
cases in federal court arising from federal questions, but not to
diversity cases (see F.R.E. 501). Montana’s privilege law determines the extent of the spousal privilege in both Montana state
courts and in diversity actions in federal court where Montana
law is the rule of decision.

MONTANA’S SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE LAW:
COMMUNICATIONS BUT NOT TESTIMONIAL
MARITAL PRIVILEGE
Montana, like the federal courts, does include a privilege for
spouses. In fact, it is the first of the twelve specific privileges
established by the Montana legislature. In its current form, the
spousal privilege statute reads:
26-1-802. Spousal privilege. Neither spouse
may, without the consent of the other, testify
during or after the marriage concerning any
communication made by one to the other
during their marriage. The privilege is restricted
to communications made during the existence
of the marriage relationship and does not extend
to communications made prior to the marriage
or to communications made after the marriage is
dissolved. The privilege does not apply to a civil
action or proceeding by one spouse against the
other or to a criminal action or proceeding for a
crime committed by one spouse against the other
or against a child of either spouse. (Emphasis
added)
Another, not inconsistent, statute appears in Title 46,
Criminal Procedure:
46-16-212. Competency of spouses
(1) Neither spouse may testify to the
communications or conversations between
spouses that occur during their marriage unless:
(a) consent of the defendant-spouse is
obtained;
(b) the defendant-spouse has been charged
with an act of criminal violence against the
other; or
(c) the defendant-spouse has been charged
with abuse, abandonment, or neglect of the
other spouse or either spouse’s children.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1), a spouse
is a competent witness for or against the other
spouse.
The Montana Supreme Court has characterized this statute
www.montanabar.org

as dealing with the competency of a witness-spouse, while Title
26 provides the privilege for communications made during the
marriage when a spouse is a witness: “both the heading and
subsection (2) of § 46-16-212, MCA, are clear that the statute
relates to the competency of spouses to testify, not spousal
privilege.” State v. Baldwin, 2003 MT 346, 318 Mont. 489, 495,
81 P.3d 488, 493.
In State v. Moore, 254 Mont. 241, 836 P.2d 604 (1992), the
Court addressed MCA 46-16-212, making it clear that it destroys any argument based on the spousal testimonial privilege
(which would make a spouse incompetent as a witness):
We conclude that testimony by the wife Michelle
Moore, if it meets other rules of evidence,
is not to be excluded on the grounds of her
competency as a witness, unless it is testimony of
communications and conversation between the
spouses during their marriage.
254 Mont. at 247, 836 P.2d at 608.
Neither of the above statutes privileges spousal testimony in
general. As Baldwin recognized, MCA 46-16-212(2) expressly
disallows a “spousal testimonial privilege” in criminal cases, and
the Commission Comment to its 1991 amendment explicitly
states: “Subsection (2) emphasizes that the privilege applies
only to communications or conversations.” This conforms to
the current language of MCA 26-1-802. The prior version of
the same statute contained an additional provision: “A husband
cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent
or a wife for or against her husband without his consent.” The
removal of this language in the 2005 legislative session effectively abolished the spousal testimonial privilege. Thus, in
Montana civil and criminal cases since 2005, there is a spousal
communication privilege but not a general spousal testimonial
privilege.
The privilege applies to communications made between
spouses during their marriage, made and kept in confidence, at
least by the spouse asserting the privilege. The witness spouse
can be compelled to testify as to what she observed, even during
the marriage, but not as to what her husband told her during
the marriage, if he didn’t tell anyone else about their communication. Because this privilege, like all others, is construed narrowly, it does not protect communications between unmarried
people, no matter how long or how committed their relationship.6 It does apply to couples who are married either through
the statutory process or through common law.7 Any communication made after that date of the marriage, until the end of the
marriage, is privileged. Communications made before or after
the marriage are not privileged.
If a couple follows the statutory route to marriage, it is
PRIVILEGE, next page
6 Because Montana explicitly forbids same-sex marriage, the privilege is unavailable to same-sex couples, even where they have participated in a “commitment”
or other marriage-like ceremony, and even where they have registered with a city
government (Missoula has such a registry) as life partners.
7 MCA 40-1-403 expressly provides: “Validity of common-law marriage. Common-law marriages are not invalidated by this chapter…” Montana is commonly
viewed as having the most liberal common-law marriage law in the country.
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Court affirmed the findings of the trial judge:

The State’s argument to the District Court and
its brief on appeal emphasize that Nettleton and
easy to tell when the marriage, and thus the communication
Semenze were never married. According to the
privilege, begins and ends: the privilege covers all confidential
State, the alleged common-law marriage between
communications after the date of the wedding, reflected by the
the two did not have the four elements necessary
state-issued marriage certificate. When does the marriage end,
under Montana common law: capability,
and thus the privilege for communications between the former
agreement, cohabitation and reputation (citing
spouses? That, too, is an easy question in most circumstances:
Matter of Estate of Murnion (Mont.1984), 686
the marital communications privilege does not cover any
P.2d 893, 41 St.Rep. 1627, and other cases).
communications between the ex-spouses after the entry of the
Whether the relationship between Nettleton and
decree of dissolution of the marriage. This applies to both statuSemenze fit the legal definition of common-law
tory and common-law marriages: the only ways out of either
marriage was a question of fact for the District
are death and formal dissolution. You can get married through
Court to decide. That decision must be upheld if
common-law, but you can’t get unmarried that way.
there is substantial, credible evidence in the record
These limits make sense in view of the public policy in favor
to support it. Griffel v. Cove Ditch Co. (1984), 207
of marriage. One of the incentives to marry is the privilege, and
Mont. 348, 675 P.2d 90, 41 St.Rep. 1.
if the State extended the reach of the privilege, that incentive
is removed. On the other end of the timeline, the purpose of
The record shows that while Semenze denied the
the privilege is to strengthen the marriage by encouraging full
existence of the marriage in her testimony, she
and frank conversation between spouses; if they have divorced,
and Nettleton lived together, had a child, opened
there is no marriage to strengthen and it is clear that the priviand used a joint checking account, and filed joint
lege was not sufficient incentive to keep them married. In both
income tax returns for two consecutive years. The
circumstances, the need for information to determine the facts
record also shows the filing of a joint petition for
and administer justice regains its supremacy and the spousal
divorce signed by Semenze and Nettleton. This
communications privilege disappears.
evidence provides a sufficient basis for the District
By its very nature, common law marriage is a much messier
Court’s decision that Nettleton and Semenze
can of worms than a statutory marriage for purposes of assessconsidered themselves married. State v. Nettleton,
ing the privilege. Couples, or a member of a couple, usually
233 Mont. 308, 311-12, 760 P.2d 733, 736 (1988).
assert that there was a common law marriage only in retrospect,
The Court then went on to apply Montana’s spousal priviwhen it has become clear that marital status confers some
lege to the various pieces of testimony from the ex-wives. It
advantage. Most of those cases involve a claim to the dissoluheld that the privilege did not apply to:
tion procedure for ending the relationship, or an inheritance
or governmental financial benefit such as Social Security. The
• Testimony by DuMontier concerning
spousal communications privilege is another such advantage.
Nettleton’s actions and statements after
The Montana Supreme Court has decided a couple of relatively
the two were divorced … because those
recent marital privilege cases where the defendant claimed he
statements were not made during marriage.
had married the witness at common law.
• Testimony involving statements or actions
by persons other than Nettleton … because
STATE V. NETTLETON (1988)
those were not communications by one
The Montana Supreme Court had the opportunity to elucispouse to the other.
date both forms of spousal privilege in 1988, when it decided
• Testimony about observations of Nettleton’s
State v. Nettleton, 233 Mont. 308, 760 P.2d 733. Nettleton was
actions; physical evidence such as Brisson’s
convicted of deliberate homicide for a 1977 murder. Two imbody, her scarf or Nettleton’s knife;
portant witnesses for the State were women who had lived with
and feelings such as the fear induced by
Nettleton, and who had information about both what he said
Nettleton’s threats and other behavior.
to them and what they observed relevant to the murder. The
defendant moved in limine to exclude their testimony, claiming
• Testimony about statements made during
that he had been married to each (in series) and that the spousal
the marriage, but in the presence of third
privilege prevented both from testifying.
persons; “The presence of third parties
The trial court held a pretrial hearing, taking evidence on the
indicates that Nettleton did not intend those
issue of whether defendant had been married to either witness.
statements to be confidential.”
The judge found that one of the women, Candace Semenze, had
• Testimony about threats by Nettleton to
been Nettleton’s common law wife from 1975 to 1982 (and thus
induce the wife’s cooperation and silence, “do
at the time of the crime), and that the other woman, Magdelina
not merit spousal privilege.”
DuMontier, had been statutorily married to Nettleton from
July 1983 until June 1986. Before the Supreme Court, the State
argued that there had been no common law marriage, but the

PRIVILEGE, next page
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The Court did find that one part of the testimony should
have been protected by spousal privilege, so that the judge erred
in admitting it, but held that the error was harmless:
The one clear instance of testimony that should
have been protected by the privilege-Nettleton’s
admission to DuMontier in response to her
question while they were married-simply restates
the same information contained in the far greater
number of non-privileged statements. The failure
of the District Court to exclude this testimony was
therefore harmless error.
State v. Nettleton, 233 Mont. 308, 317-18, 760 P.2d
733, 739 (1988).

STATE V. BALDWIN (2003)
In State v. Baldwin, 2003 MT 346, 318 Mont. 489, 495, 81
P.3d 488, 493, the defendant objected to testimony from Karin
Baldwin, whom the government had called as a hostile witness.
The defendant objected to her testimony at trial, claiming that
Karin was his common-law spouse and that he was entitled
to a spousal communications privilege. Karin and Baldwin
solemnized their marriage on October 16, 2001, after Baldwin
had been charged, but before his trial on December 3, 2001.
(Baldwin also argued that he and Karin had been in a commonlaw marriage for six years prior to the ceremony, so that the
privilege extended to the communications between them from
1995.) The trial court overruled the objection and allowed the
testimony. The Supreme Court found error8:
We conclude that because Baldwin and Karin
were married at the time of Baldwin’s trial, Karin’s
testimony should have been excluded based upon
spousal privilege, pursuant to § 26-1-802, MCA.
State v. Baldwin, 2003 MT 346, 318 Mont. 489,
495, 81 P.3d 488, 493.
The majority opinion went no further on its analysis of the
application of the marital communications privilege, for which
Justice Rice took them to task in his concurrence, joined by
Justices Gray and Leaphart. He correctly observed:
¶ 33 The Court concludes in ¶ 26 that because
Baldwin and Karin were married at the time of
trial, Karin’s testimony in regard to a statement
made prior to the solemnization of their marriage
was inadmissible under the spousal privilege
statute. However, this is an incorrect conclusion
under Montana law. The spousal privilege does
not bar admission of a statement made between
two persons who were not married at the time
the statement was made. (Emphasis added)
State v. Baldwin, 2003 MT 346, 318 Mont. 489,
8 As with so many evidentiary error cases, the Court further found the error to
be harmless, discussing the strength of other evidence on the same issue, and affirmed the conviction.
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497, 81 P.3d 488, 494.
Justice Rice did a more thorough analysis and concluded
that:
¶ 36 Karin›s testimony was not made inadmissible
by virtue of the fact that she and Baldwin were
married at the time of trial. To the contrary, the
inquiry centers on their status at the time the
contested statement was made. If they were not
married at that time, then the statement could not
“convey a message from one spouse to the other”
and could not have been “conveyed in reliance
on the confidence of the marital relationship.”
Nettleton, 233 Mont. at 317, 760 P.2d at 739
(original emphasis). Because the solemnization
of the marriage had not occurred at the time the
statement was made, Karin’s testimony about the
statement was not barred thereby.
318 Mont. at 497.
In support of his objection at trial, the defendant also
claimed a pre-existing common-law marriage. The judge
excused the jury and held a brief evidentiary hearing on the
question of the common-law marriage:
The direct and cross-examination produced
testimony that Baldwin and Karin had not
shared finances or income tax returns during
their relationship, had been separated for a year
prior to the solemnization, that Baldwin had an
intervening relationship with another woman, and
that the parties decided to marry by solemnization
because, according to Karin, “I wanted to get
married. We’ve been wanting to get married a
long time.”
State v. Baldwin, 2003 MT 346, 318 Mont. 489,
498, 81 P.3d 488, 495.
Justice Rice concluded that the “District Court’s evidentiary
ruling that no common law marriage existed was founded upon
substantial evidence, and therefore, Karin’s testimony concerning the statement was not barred by the spousal privilege.” State
v. Baldwin, 2003 MT 346, 318 Mont. 489, 498, 81 P.3d 488, 495.
The proof of a common-law marriage is beyond the scope of
this article, but I can suggest that this issue requires extensive
fact-finding, and would be better dealt with in a motion and
hearing in limine than by excusing the jury in the middle of a
trial.

WAIVING THE PRIVILEGE
Clearly privileged confidential spousal communications
may be admissible if the spouse who claims the privilege waives
it. Waiver can occur by voluntary disclosure of the contents of
the communication by the person who now claims the privilege or by failure of counsel to object in discovery or at trial.
Additionally, some Montana cases have refused to allow the
privilege when sexual abuse has occurred, reasoning that the
PRIVILEGE, next page
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“home” which the privilege is designed to support no longer
exists.

Voluntary Disclosure Outside Judicial Proceedings
One way waiver can occur is if the spouse him/herself
“shares” the communication with someone outside the marriage before trial. An essential element of a privileged communication is that it was made in confidence and afterwards
kept confidential. Thus, a husband who tells his wife something
during their marriage, but then describes that conversation to
his hunting buddy9 has waived the privilege and should lose his
objection at trial. M.R.E. 503 covers this:
(a) A person upon whom these rules confer a
privilege against disclosure waives the privilege
if the person or the person’s predecessor while
the holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or
consents to disclosure of any significant part of the
privileged matter. This rule does not apply if the
disclosure itself is privileged.
(b) Joint holders. Where two or more persons are
joint holders of a privilege, a waiver of the right of
a particular joint holder to claim the privilege does
not affect the right of another joint holder to claim
the privilege.
In re Marriage of Sarsfield seemed to use this waiver theory
when it affirmed admission of an ex-wife’s testimony about
things her husband told her while they were married. The
Sarsfields were involved in a custody dispute which arose when
the former Mrs. Sarsfield agreed to marry a man (“M.M.”) with
a history of child sexual abuse. Mr. Sarsfield sought a change in
custody for the Sarsfield children, and called the ex-wife of the
prospective new husband to testify at trial.
M.M.’s former wife was called as a witness. She
testified that her daughter had been removed from
the family home because she had been sexually
abused by M.M. She had never witnessed any
incidents of abuse, but her husband had admitted
the incidents to her. M.M. indicated to his wife
that, for at least six years prior to his admission,
he had “used various items, his hands, pokers,
various instruments of that sort to induce her [the
daughter] in various ways” on several occasions.
No criminal charges were filed against M.M., but
the daughter was removed by authorities and
underwent treatment for emotional problems
connected with the abuse.
After her return from therapy, M.M. admitted
to his wife that he had sexually molested the girl
again. The daughter was removed to a childrens’
9 It is ok to disclose the communication to another person with whom the
spouse has a privileged relationship, such as his attorney or minister. See the last
sentence of Rule 503(a).
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[sic] home where she continues to undergo
therapy. According to the former wife, M.M. is
not allowed to see the girl without others present.
He admitted his problem to counselors, but has
apparently not committed any deviant acts since
the last incident with his daughter.
In re Marriage of Sarsfield, 206 Mont. 397, 405,
671 P.2d 595, 600 (1983).
Although the ex-wife’s observations during the marriage
to M.M. would not now be covered by a spousal testimonial
privilege, it did exist back then, and her entire testimony should
have been barred under it. Even under the more limited extant
spousal communications privilege, the ex-wife’s testimony
about what M.M. told her in confidence during their marriage
should have been privileged and the objection sustained.
The custodial mother’s attorney did object at trial on the
basis of the spousal privilege, to no avail. The trial judge allowed
the testimony, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision in
a very murky paragraph:
Clearly, the subject of the supposedly privileged
communications had been revealed to welfare
authorities and, as it turned out later, to M.M.’s
“counselor,” Paster [sic] Miller. We agree with the
trial court that the testimony of M.M.’s wife was
not protected by the spousal privilege under these
facts.
In re Marriage of Sarsfield, 206 Mont. 397, 407,
671 P.2d 595, 601 (1983).
This reasoning is wrong, at least under the current version
of M.R.E. 503. The discloser of the communication to welfare
authorities was not M.M. himself, but his wife. She cannot
waive the privilege unilaterally, per M.R.E. 503(b), or if he does
not have an opportunity to invoke the privilege. M.R.E. 504
provides:
Rule 504. Privileged matter disclosed under
compulsion or without opportunity to claim the
privilege. A claim of privilege is not defeated by
a disclosure which was (a) compelled erroneously
or (b) made without opportunity to claim the
privilege.
Thus, the then-wife’s revelation to “welfare authorities”
should not operate as a waiver of the husband’s spousal privilege. Further, M.M.’s own disclosure to his “counselor” or
“paster”? might itself be privileged10, and thus fit M.R.E. 503’s
clear provision that waiver by voluntary disclosure: “does not

PRIVILEGE, next page
10 Montana recognizes privileges for communications with members of the
clergy, M.C.A. 26-1-804, and psychologists, M.C.A. 26-1-807. The Sarsfield opinion
does not discuss either of these in detail, but it does evince skepticism about the
status of the “counselor.”
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apply if the disclosure itself is privileged.”11

Child Abuse
Sarsfield did offer another basis for its refusal to apply the
spousal privilege, which seems to have been the real reason
M.M.’s ex-wife could testify:
This privilege, however, is subject to the maxim
that, when the reason for a rule ceases to exist,
so then should the rule. See Section 1-3-201,
MCA. Thus, in Matter of J.H., we held that once
a family member has been sexually abused, the
sanctity of the home and therefore the reason
for the rule are simultaneously destroyed, 640
P.2d at 447, 39 St.Rep. at 269, and that a mother
could testify about her husband’s sexual abuse of
their son in a child neglect proceeding, where the
father was a party to the action. In the immediate
case, the sexual abuse of M.M.’s daughter
decidedly contributed to the destruction of the
family home and M.M.’s marriage. Under the
circumstances, we believe the privilege concerning
communications about this abuse died with the
marriage, and we are disinclined to invoke the
privilege even though M.M. and his former wife
are not parties to this custody battle.
In re Marriage of Sarsfield, 206 Mont. 397, 406-07,
671 P.2d 595, 600-01 (1983).
Five years later, the Montana Supreme Court left the
Sarsfield holding, and rationale in child abuse cases, standing,
but acknowledged the difficulty it presents:
In this case, we are concerned only with
spouses. Rather than muddying the waters by
attempting to apply the rule from Sarsfield and
J.H. to the present situation, we will evaluate the
District Court’s ruling in light of the threshold
characteristics outlined above.
State v. Nettleton, 233 Mont. 308, 315-16, 760 P.2d
733, 738 (1988).

possession of illegal golden eagle feathers and parts. At trial,
the then-divorced wife testified about a written communication
from her husband during the marriage. On appeal, the husband claimed error. The Supreme Court held:
¶ 30 Torgerson contends on appeal that the
District Court violated § 26–1–802, MCA, in
admitting the above testimony by Doane. He
claims the court had granted him a continuing
objection on grounds of spousal immunity.
¶ 31 As indicated above, the record reflects that
the court told defense counsel prior to trial “[i]
f [spousal immunity] does come up, raise your
objections, if you want a continuing objection to
some of those things.” Torgerson did not follow
the District Court’s directive; nor did he object
to the testimony he now argues was improperly
admitted. As a result, we conclude he may not
now argue trial court error in this regard. See §
46–20–104(2), MCA; State v. Clausell, 2001 MT
62, ¶ 25, 305 Mont. 1, ¶ 25, 22 P.3d 1111, ¶ 25
(citation omitted).
State v. Torgerson, 2008 MT 303, 345 Mont. 532,
539, 192 P.3d 695, 700.
Ouch! Not only must you object, you must keep objecting.
I myself am not a fan of the “continuing objection” precisely
because it is unclear when you are objecting, what you are
objecting to, and what the judge’s ruling is. If you are going
to use that route (for the strategic purpose of not irritating the
jury with a constant stream of objections), be sure to articulate
exactly what your “continuing objection” covers. In the perfect
world, try to get the court to state on the record both that you
have constructively objected to all questions and answer about
what one spouse told the other during the marriage, and that
the judge has overruled your objection on each and every such
piece of testimony.

PREVENTING WAIVER
Client Instruction

A sad fact of lawyering is that our clients do not check with
us before they go for coffee with friends. The corollary is that
we often come to the party too late, and the client may already
This judge-made “child abuse” exception is a possible avenue to invading the marital privilege, and you might as well try have shared his conversation with his wife with an outsider, destroying the spousal communications privilege. However, once
it if it fits your situation, but I wouldn’t bet on it.
the client does cross your threshold, it is imperative to instruct
Failure to Object
her about privileges in general, and if she is or has been married, the spousal communications privilege in general. Tell her
The other avenue to waiver is failure to object in discovery
or at trial. A recent example occurred in a poaching case, where that she can tell you things you must and can keep confidential,
and that the same is true of her conversations with her husband,
the estranged wife went to Fish and Game and turned in her
but that if she tells anyone else (friend, mother, neighbor etc.)
husband for several instances of hunting out of season and for
about the contents of those privileged conversations, she loses
the privilege. She is the owner of the privilege, and only she can
11 The spousal privilege statute now does address this issue, but its waiver is
protect it.
much narrower and would not have affected the privilege of M.M. in the Sarsfield
situation: The privilege does not apply to a civil action or proceeding by one
spouse against the other or to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one spouse against the other or against a child of either spouse.
M.C.A. 26-1-802.
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Objection

“What did your wife tell you about…?”
OBJECTION! PRIVILEGE!

It is much more likely that the question will be less obvious,
Once you, the lawyer, have come on board in the case, you
or that the conversation will come out in response to another
share the burden of maintaining the privilege during discovery type of question altogether. The trick is to recognize and object
and at trial. You can invoke the privilege, and you can lose it by as soon as the privilege becomes apparent:
failure to do so.
“And then what happened?”
M.R.Civ.P. 26b specifically permits an objection to any
discovery question calling for privileged information: “Parties
“Well, I was so shook up that I went straight home
may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter…”
and told my wife …”
The form of the objection itself is simple: “Objection, spousal
privilege.” However, Montana now echoes the F.R.Civ.P. and
OBJECTION! PRIVILEGE!
requires the objector to provide information to back up the
[… “that I had hit a bicyclist and left him on the
claim of privilege:
side of the road”]
(6) Claiming Privilege or Protecting TrialPreparation Materials.

A) Information Withheld. When a party
withholds information otherwise discoverable
by claiming that the information is privileged
or subject to protection as trial-preparation
material, the party must:

“I am handing you a document premarked as
Exhibit A.”

   (i) expressly make the claim; and

“Can you identify Exhibit A?”

  (ii) describe the nature of the documents,
communications, or things not produced
or disclosed -- and do so in a manner
that, without revealing information itself
privileged or protected, will enable other
parties to assess the claim.

“Yes.”

M.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(6). To fulfill this requirement, you should
indicate that the information involves an oral or written communication between spouses during the marriage, being as
specific as you can about the form and dates of the communications without divulging the contents of the communications.
This advice is fairly easy to follow during written discovery,
when you have time to reflect and craft responses. It is more
difficult, but equally important, to guard the privilege during
oral testimony at deposition or in trial. You must object and instruct the witness not to answer (until a judge has ruled on the
objection). In depositions, you don’t have the luxury of a ruling
in limine, and a waiver of the privilege there may lead to a ruling that the privilege has been waived at trial. I once had a case
against a former student whom I liked very much (luckily, I had
taught the student Civil Procedure but not Evidence; still…) In
the defendant’s deposition, I asked him: “Have you talked to
anyone else about this?” He said: “Yes, my wife.” There was no
reaction from his lawyer, and so on I went for about 5 minutes,
with no objection: “What did you tell her?” “What did she say?”
The defendant eventually told me that his wife had objected
strenuously to his plan, and had told him both that it was immoral, illegal, and stupid. (She wasn’t wrong). I was conflicted
the whole time this was going on, wanting my former student
to jump up and stop me, but that never happened and of course
my paramount duty was to my client. (The case settled, so we
never got to the admissibility of those answers at trial.)
The obvious cue is a question like:
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Remember that “communication” does not have to be verbal. Obviously, written communications like letters (remember
those?), notes, and emails are all communications which are
privileged if sent by one spouse to another during the marriage.

“How can you identify Exhibit A?”
“It is in my ex-wife’s handwriting”
OBJECTION! PRIVILEGE! MAY I VOIR DIRE
outside the presence of the jury?
“Sir, is Exhibit A a letter sent by your ex-wife?”
“Yes.”
“Was it sent to you?”
“Yes.”
“At the time she sent you this letter, you were still
married, weren’t you?”
“Yes.”
I RENEW MY OBJECTION. EXHIBIT A IS A
PRIVILEGED SPOUSAL COMMUNICATION.
You should file a motion in limine to assert the privilege
and get a pretrial ruling if you anticipate that a spouse will be
called as a witness at trial. Even if you do this, remember State
v. Torgerson (discussed above) and object to every piece of testimony at trial which invades the spousal privilege. Watch out
for opponents who might try to sneak around a pretrial ruling
by indirect language, and for witnesses who testify, wittingly or
not, about what their spouses told them. You may have already
won a ruling that spousal privilege applies, but it is up to you to
get the benefit of the ruling.

Rescuing the Privilege
The recently-revised M.R.Civ.P provide a mechanism for
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“clawing back” privileged material produced during discovery:
(B) Information Produced. If information
produced in discovery is subject to a claim of
privilege, the party making the claim may notify
any party that received the information of the
claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a
party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy
the specified information and any copies it has;
must not use or disclose the information until the
claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to
retrieve the information if the party disclosed it
before being notified; and may promptly present
the information to the court under seal for a
determination of the claim. The producing party
must preserve the information until the claim is
resolved.
M.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(6)(B). I have not found any cases applying
this provision to production of marital privileged information,
but I would use this if I inadvertently sent in my discovery responses a letter or email between spouses. It might also be useful in the deposition scenario I described above, if the opposing
lawyer had gone back to the office and realized that a breach of
the privilege had just occurred. Note that this rule does not set
any standard for when disclosure amounts to waiver, but it does
freeze the use of the information once a notification and request
is made and provides a process for a court determination of the
effect of the disclosure.

DEVELOPING PROOF OF WAIVER
If the party-spouse objects to questions (in discovery or at trial) about conversations with spouse, the opponent
should investigate (through discovery and otherwise) whether
the objector discussed the spousal conversation with anyone
else. Example:
Q. Did you talk to anyone else about this
transaction?
A. Yes.
Q. With whom?
A. My wife.
Q. What did you say to her about the transaction?
Counsel: OBJECTION. PRIVILEGED. DO NO
ANSWER.
Q. Don’t tell me what you said to your wife, or
she to you. But I do want to know whether you
have told anyone else about the conversation with
your wife. Did you tell any other person about
what you said to your wife, or what she said to
you?
A. My lawyer.
Counsel: OBJECTION. PRIVILEGED. DO NOT
ANSWER.
www.montanabar.org

Q. Don’t tell me what you told your lawyer, either.
Was there anyone else besides your lawyer to
whom you described your conversation with your
wife?
A. Yes, I told my mother about that conversation.
I told Mom what I told my wife, and what my wife
said back to me.
Q. Aha! What did you tell your mother12?
Q. Now let’s go back: what did you tell your wife
about the transaction?
Because the party himself disclosed the content of the spousal communication, he waived the protection of the privilege
and must divulge the communication with his wife.

CAVEAT: PRIVILEGE ONLY PROTECTS THE
COMMUNICATION, NOT THE FACT
Obviously, a privilege does not prevent the discovery of the
underlying fact itself. The prosecutor can still investigate and
present evidence as to the identity of that guy who ran down
Arthur Avenue in Missoula carrying a semi-automatic handgun and a paper bag (presumably containing the loot from his
robbery of the Taco Bell at 9:30 a.m. on a recent snowy morning), resulting in a 3 hour extremely inconvenient (just sayin’)
lockdown of the University of Montana. The state just can’t do
it by putting a wife on the stand to say “my husband told me13
he was the masked man.”

MORAL OF THE STORY
One of the benefits of marriage is the ability to confide in
your spouse without fear that she will be compelled to testify
against you about what you told her. (You no longer get the
ability to prevent her from being called to the stand to recount
that she saw you with the bloody knife, burning your bloody
clothes, on the night of the stabbing). Only the communications you make during the marriage are protected; it is your
marital status at the time of the communication, not at the time
of trial, which counts. Although it is possible to obtain the
privilege by proving to the court at trial that you were married by common law at the time of the conversation, it is much
easier and clearer to go to the courthouse, get a license, and go
through a formal ceremony. You can freely divulge your most
intimate secrets to your husband and know that he can’t testify
about them, even if you do end up getting divorced. So, put a
ring on it!
Cynthia Ford is a professor at the University of Montana School of Law
where she teaches civil procedure, evidence, family law, and remedies.

12 Neither the FRE nor the MRE recognize any parent-child privilege, so disclosure to the mother amounts to disclosure of the contents of a privileged conversation just as if the husband described the privileged conversation to a bartender.
13 Of course, this would not be hearsay, per M.R.E. 801d2a: “A statement is not
hearsay if… The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party’s own
statement…”
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